CTTE_A_206798.fm Page 635 Thursday, November 30, 2006 12:47 PM

Third Text, Vol. 20, Issue 6, November, 2006, 635–645

Routledge

Europe's Migrations

The Numbers and the Passions are Not New

Saskia Sassen

There is growing conviction throughout the pre-enlargement European member states that its major economies cannot absorb the immigration inflow from new member states and from other non-EU or so called 'third countries'. The reasons are high unemployment, insufficient state resources to handle the added burdens and growing anti-immigrant sentiment.

All three are facts. But what the EU can and cannot do given these facts is less clear. Europe's major economies will need more, not fewer, workers willing to take low-wage jobs. Second, Europe's demographics point to an estimated fall from today's population of 350 million to 287 million by the century's end, with a majority aged sixty-five and over. And third, Europe's history of anti-immigrant sentiment shows us that we have been here many times before. It also confirms that over the generations of each immigration cycle we have incorporated vast numbers of immigrants so that today we are actually a mix: the *they* have become the *us* over our five centuries of intra-European migrations. But these facts are easily forgotten in the heat of anti-immigrant sentiment. An examination of each of these illuminates constraints and potentials.[1]

MIGRATION AS EMBEDDED PROCESS

The evidence for the last two centuries shows that labour migrations are patterned in terms of geography and duration. Once a migration flow has taken hold it is not an irreversible flow that only keeps growing. It is highly modulated. Similarly, in terms of notions of mass invasion, it is important to note that even though migrants have tended to come largely from poorer areas, they were typically only a section of the population. One never sees anything akin to a massive flood of the poor from a country or region. Nor does an 'invasion' ever seem to have happened. It is a minority of a region's or country's people that migrated.

1 Saskia Sassen, *Guests and Aliens: Europe and Its Migrations*, New Press, New York, 2000. For an examination of the option that national states have today, see Saskia Sassen, *Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2006, http://www.pupress.princeton.edu/titles/8159.html

Third Text ISSN 0952-8822 print/ISSN 1475-5297 online © Third Text (2006)
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
DOI: 10.1080/09528820601068658

We might argue that such massive flows have not happened because states have managed to control their border to some extent. I have sought elsewhere to understand whether massive movements from poor to rich areas have happened when states had not yet gained full technical and bureaucratic capacities to control borders and were not much concerned with the issue (see note 1). I used the intra-European migrations of the nineteenth century as an experimental base to answer this question because the region contained rich and poor places, distances were not so great and states did not thoroughly control their borders. But even under these conditions there were no massive movements from poverty to prosperity. Why, with so many poor in some regions, with inequality in wages and work opportunities between regions, and with virtually no border controls, did all the poor or the vast majority of them not migrate to the sites of prosperity?

Research on migration has established a few facts that have begun to answer this question. We now know that most people do not want to migrate. Further, in Europe as in many other regions, in the past and present, labour migrations take place within systemic settings. Finally, several mechanisms contribute to the size, geography and duration of migrations. From a macrosocietal perspective these can be seen as akin to equilibrating mechanisms. The importance of recruitment and networks, often spatially circumscribed networks, the frequency of circular migrations that connect specific places of origins with specific destinations over long periods of time, all of these signal the extent to which migrations are embedded in and shaped by specific systems.

Important to the current debate and panic is the fact that these features were there long before states were able to control their borders: thus the shaping effect is not simply a consequence of immigration policy as such. As far as we know, all 'mass' migrations began because of larger geopolitical or economic conditions. There is typically something in addition to the will of individual migrants that contributes to form a new migratory flow. Among these are economic conditions such as the Atlantic economy of the l800s, the EU, NAFTA; politico-military conditions such as the colonial systems of several European countries and US involvement in Central America; transnational war zones (eg, the formation of massive refugee flows as a result of major European wars); cultural-ideological zones (eg, the impact in socialist countries of the image of Western democracies as offering the 'good life' to each and all). Today we can add the globalising of old networks for the trafficking of people.

There is a second pattern, which earlier nineteenth-century intra-European migrations allow us to see. Even though 'immigrants' had the same phenotype and broadly European culture, they were discriminated against. Immigrants were marked as 'the other'. These were times when population growth was slow, mortality high, labour shortages acute and population growth was generally considered as enormously desirable. But immigrants were seen as undesirable by many sectors of the larger society, demonstrating that, beyond issues of fairness and social justice, people are able and ideologically willing to override their actual needs. Today the argument against immigration may be focused on questions of race, religion and culture, and might seem rational. But in sifting through the historical and current evidence I find only new contents for

an old passion: the racialising of the outsider as 'other'. Today the 'other' is stereotyped by difference of race, religion and culture. Equivalent arguments were made in the past when migrants were broadly of the same religious, racial and cultural group: they were seen as not fitting in with the receiving society, as having bad habits and the wrong morals. Migration hinges on a move between two worlds, even if within a single region or country – such as East Germans moving to West Germany who were seen as a different ethnic group and one with undesirable traits. Today as then, we are in need of immigrants for economic and demographic reasons but many are blinded by anti-immigrant politics.

A third major issue is the fact that labour migrations are embedded in larger systems. That is to say, it is not simply a matter of the poor deciding to come to rich countries. If this were the case, we should plan on well over three billion people engaging in such movements, when in fact today there are only about 100 million who have migrated to the rich countries, less than four per cent of the world's poor. So poverty itself is not enough to explain emigration. Nor is it helpful for politicians to think that all the poor will come: it leads to the wrong policies.[2]

Establishing whether labour migration is an integral part of how an economic and social system operates and evolves is, in my view, critical. The logic of this argument is, put simply, as follows: If immigration is thought of as the result of individuals in search of a better life, immigration is seen by the receiving country as an exogenous process formed and shaped by conditions outside the receiving country. The receiving country is then saddled with the task of accommodating this population. In this view, as poverty and overpopulation grow, there may be a parallel growth in immigration – at least potentially. The receiving country becomes a passive bystander to processes outside its domain and control, and hence with few options but to tighten its frontiers if it is to avoid an 'invasion'.

If, on the other hand, immigration is partly conditioned on the operation of the economic system in receiving countries, the latter can implement domestic policies that can regulate the employment of immigrants. Thus, if a country such as the US seeks to make manufacturing more competitive by making production cheaper using sweatshops, it is a participant in the formation of a sweated immigrant workforce. Also the growing demand for low-wage service workers in the new growth sectors of developed economies is a domestic condition. In both cases, the receiving country is not a passive bystander to the immigration process. Further, there is something these governments can do beyond controlling borders – they can make those jobs more attractive to resident immigrants and to citizens. Finally, at the global scale, receiving countries need to recognise that when they outsource jobs to low-wage countries they are building bridges for future migrations. Yes, immigration happens in a context of inequality between countries, but inequality by itself is not enough to lead to emigration. Inequality needs to be activated as a migration push factor – through organised recruitment, neo-colonial bonds, etc.[3]

The economic, political and social conditions in the receiving country contribute in many ways to set the parameters for immigration flows. Immigration flows may take a while to adjust to changes in levels of labour demand or to the saturation of opportunities, but will always

2 Immigrants remain under 3 per cent of global population. From an estimate of 85 million international immigrants in the world, or 2.1 per cent of world population in 1975, this rose to 175 million or 2.9 per cent of world population by 2000, and an estimate of between 185 and 192 million in 2005 (IOM 2006). It is important to note the increased concentration of migrants in the developed world and generally in a limited number of countries. About 30 countries account for over 75 per cent of all immigration; eleven of these are developed countries with over 40 per cent of all immigrants.

3 Saskia Sassen, *The Mobility of Labour and Capital: A Study in International Investment and Labour Flow*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1988, Part 2

tend eventually to adjust to the conditions in receiving countries, even if these adjustments are imperfect. Thus there was a decline in the growth rate of Polish immigration to Germany once it was clear that the opportunities were not as plentiful, and this movement was replaced by circular migration in many East to West flows, including from the former East Germany to West Germany. The size and duration of flows is shaped by these conditions: it is not an exogenous process shaped only by poverty and population growth elsewhere, and hence autonomous from the accommodation capacities of receiving countries.

If size and duration are shaped overall by conditions in receiving countries then the possibility of reasonably effective immigration policies also exists. Managing a patterned and conditioned flow of immigrants is a rather different matter from controlling an 'invasion'. Implementation of an effective policy does not necessarily mean perfect synchronisation between conditions in the receiving country and immigrant inflow and settlement. This will never be the case. Immigration is a process constituted by human beings with will and agency, with multiple identities and life trajectories beyond the fact of being seen, defined and categorised as immigrants for the purposes of the receiving polity, economy and society. There is no definitive proof in this matter. But there are patterns, and past patterns, that have lived their full life. They can tell us something about the extent to which immigration has consisted of a series of bounded events with beginnings, endings and specific geographies – all partly shaped by the operation and organisation of receiving economies, polities and societies.

CROSS-COUNTRY REGULARITIES

My examination of the past two centuries and the vast scholarly literature on immigration in Western Europe points to a number of cross-country regularities. The purpose here is to establish whether immigration flows today have geographic, temporal and institutional boundaries that indicate a definition of the 'where', 'when', and 'who' of immigration. These cross-country regularities contribute to a far more qualified understanding of immigration and hence of policy options:

1 *Emigration always encompasses a small share of a country's population.* Except for terror-driven refugees, we now know that most people are quite reluctant to leave their home villages or towns. Most Mexicans have not left their country and moved to the US and most people in Poland are not going to try to come to Germany, nor will most Algerians try to come to France. In fact, the evidence shows that even when there is a massive flow, it often is a persecuted people who dominate such flows. Thus most emigrants from the East to Germany in the early 1990s when the wall came down were Roma people from Romania and ethnic Germans, two populations with very specific reasons for migrating. There are individuals and groups who are determined to come (pent-up demand) and will come no matter what. But this is not the typical case. There is a grey area of potential emigrants who may or may not leave, depending on pull factors; but the vast majority of people in a poor country are not likely to consider emigration.

This was already the case in the nineteenth century when borders were not controlled because the state lacked the technical capacities to do so. Even then emigration was confined to a minority of people. This holds even when we consider sub-national regions. For instance, some of the historically highest emigration levels were reached in several southern Italian districts. When we specify such districts in very limited geographic terms, we find that the highest rates were only forty per thousand at the height of mass emigration from Italy to the Americas.

Within the EU today where EU nationals can easily move to another country and there is still considerable variation in earnings levels across member states, EU figures for both the pre- and post-enlargement period show little cross-country migration among EU residents, going from 5 per cent to 5.5 per cent.

2 *Immigrants are typically a minority of a country's population.* According to the latest available data,[4] 25 million non-nationals (residents who are not citizens of the country where they live) lived in the EU25 in 2004, or 5.5 per cent of the population. In half of these countries non-nationals were under 5 per cent of the population; they were over 10 per cent of the population in Luxembourg, and, mostly due to the long term resident former Soviet residents, in Latvia and Estonia. A good share of non-nationals are from other EU countries. The highest increases in non-nationals from 1990 to 2004 were in Luxembourg, Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Ireland and Austria. There were declines in Belgium. In the pre-enlargement period, immigrants were 5 per cent (18.8 million) of the EU population. Then and today, third country immigrants count for a minority of the total European population. For instance, pre-enlargement, eight major EU countries had a total immigrant population of 2.5 million from the Maghreb, a group that has engendered considerable debate around questions of cultural and religious obstacles to incorporation. This was 13.3 per cent of the total immigrant population in the EU, less than 1 per cent of the total European population. These levels have not changed much, even if the numbers may have grown, as has the total EU population, from 350 million to approximately 470 million. Similar concern has been raised about Turks. The vast majority of all Turkish immigrants in the EU are in Germany, where they represent 2.4 per cent of the German population. In the old EU member states, the incidence of non-nationals is not particularly high. In the UK, non-nationals represented 4.2 per cent of the population in 1990 and 4.7 per cent in 2004, with the Irish the largest single group. In Ireland by 2004 non-nationals represented 7 per cent of the population, with British the largest single group. In the Netherlands they were 4.3 per cent and in France 5.6. Overall, the levels are not quite an invasion as is so often suggested.

3 *There is considerable return migration*, except when the military-political situation in countries of origin makes this unfeasible. For example, we now know that about 60 per cent of Italians who left for the US around the turn of the century returned to Italy. The incidence of cross-border residence by EU nationals has declined since 1970, partly as a function of the return of Italian, Spanish and Portuguese immigrant workers to their home countries. We are seeing generally more and more circular migration in the Mediterranean and, until the US government militarised the border with Mexico, also in the Americas. This all

4 Eurostat, 'Non-national Populations in the EU Member States', May 2006, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-NK-06-008/EN/KS-NK-06-008-EN.PDF (accessed 20 November 2006)

suggests that the fact of return migration may become a different phenomenon – not a definitive return but a circular movement. It calls for considering the sending and receiving areas as part of a single economic, social and political system. It is within this system that immigrants make their own individual decisions and take action.

4 *One important tendency is towards the formation of permanent settlements* for a variable share of immigrants, but never all. This tendency is likely even when there are high return rates and even when a country's policies seek to prevent permanent settlement. We see this happening in all countries receiving immigrants, including extremely closed countries such as Japan (with illegal immigration from the Philippines, Thailand and other Asian countries, as well as legal immigrations from several Latin American countries), and Saudi Arabia, as well as in the more liberal Western nations.

5 No matter what political culture and particular migration policies a country adopts, *unauthorised immigration has emerged as a generalised fact in all Western economies in the post-Second World War era*, including Japan. This has raised a whole set of questions about the need to rethink regulatory enforcement and the sites for such enforcement. Although the fact of such unauthorised immigration suggests that it is possible to enter these countries no matter what policies are in place, the available evidence makes it clear that the majority of unauthorised immigrants are from the same nationality groups as the legal population and they are typically fewer in number than the legal population. Again, this signals a measure of boundedness in the process of unauthorised immigration and the possibility that it is shaped by similar systemic conditions as the legal population, thereby similarly limited in its scope and scale.

6 *Immigration is a highly differentiated process*: it includes people seeking permanent settlement and those seeking temporary employment who want to circulate back and forth. The two major patterns that are emerging today are circular migration and permanent settlement. Circular migration was a key pattern in the nineteenth century before border controls were instituted in any systematic way. We also know that there was a significant increase in the permanent resident immigrant population after borders were closed in EU countries in 1973–74, suggesting that some of this growth might not have occurred if the option of circular migration had existed. Much migration has to do with supplementing household income in countries of origin rather than with permanent settlement. Given enormous earnings differentials, a limited stay in a high-wage country is sufficient.

One important question is whether recognising these differences might facilitate the formulation of policy today. There is a growing presence of immigrants who are not searching for a new home in a new country; they think of themselves as moving in a cross-border and even global labour market. We know that when illegal immigrants are regularised, they often establish permanent residence in their country of origin and work a few months in the immigration country, an option that becomes available when they can circulate more freely. We know that some of the Polish women who now work as cleaners in Berlin out of financial necessity only want to do this work for three or four months a year and then return to their home towns. This is also the case with

CTTE_A_206798.fm Page 641 Thursday, November 30, 2006 12:47 PM

some of the African migrants in Italy. The share and numbers of those who seek to become permanent residents seems to be considerably smaller than the numbers of the total resident foreign population suggest.

It is against this larger context that I now want to examine the current conjuncture in the EU, beginning with the question of the need for immigrant workers and leading into the political matter of anti-immigrant sentiment.

WE WILL NEED IMMIGRANTS

One of the major dynamics feeding immigration from poorer countries is the vast and growing demand for workers who are willing to take low-wage dead-end jobs in our advanced economies. Natives, including second- and third-generation immigrants, have in good part become socialised into better expectations and are unwilling to take these jobs even when there is high unemployment. Any of our economies today clearly illustrates this, with the US as the most extreme illustration of this pattern.

The production of a large supply of low-wage dead-end jobs is paralleled by an increased supply of very high-income professional-level jobs. All developed economies show growing earnings inequality since the 1980s. Nowhere is this clearer than in the US. To put this in perspective, the greater inequality in the US is such that the bottom tier actually experiences lower living standards than is the case in other less wealthy developed countries. Thus, even those countries whose earnings median is only about seventy per cent of the US median have a better standard of living in the bottom percentile than does the US. Further, earnings inequality has increased regardless of the country's initial level of inequality. Thus Scandinavian countries have long had less inequality than the rest of the EU, so the growing inequality beginning in the 1980s is less evident there; but it is there. The evidence shows higher growth rates for top-level jobs (high-level professionals and executives) and low-level jobs (cleaners, security guards, retail sales jobs, attendants of all kinds) than in the middle sectors (specialised manufacturing, mid-level supervisors, public sector mid-range employees) whose often standardised jobs have increasingly been automated or outsourced to low-wage countries.

Earnings inequality as such is nothing new. So why does it seem to be different today and create the labour supply issues that lead to a need for immigrants? Two major differences have emerged since the 1980s and distinguish the current period from the post-Second World War decades. First, a growing proportion of low-wage jobs today are not the first steps of a ladder to advancement opportunities. They are a dead-end. In the postwar period there were bridges from one level to the next. Those bridges are largely gone today. In contrast to high-level jobs that show returns (salary, promotion) to advanced education and work experience, a growing share of low-wage jobs show minimal if any returns to workers, no matter how hard a worker tries or how much additional education he or she secures.

The second major difference with the post-Second World Was period is the rapid growth of several labour-intensive service industries with

multiple low-wage and often arduous jobs that are difficult to automate or to shift to foreign countries: cleaning, care of children and the elderly, nursing, retail sales, restaurants, catering, waiters, taxi drivers. Our societies need workers in situ for these jobs. Further, these jobs matter to our societies as is clear in the case of care for children and the elderly. They ought to be upgraded, given higher wages and benefits to recognise their importance, which is much greater than many a high-level financial trader's contribution to our society. But even then they would remain unattractive to many native workers because these are often dead-end jobs.

The evidence suggests that the increase in low-wage jobs is in good part a result of new labour market policies, notably deregulation, and the creation of new types of jobs. It is not simply because of a supply of low-wage immigrants.

Following the US model of sharp inequality, this would be the biggest cause for further immigration from low-wage countries. It would also allow for a greater absorption of workers willing to take low-wage dead-end jobs, thereby reproducing these types of jobs and contributing to forms of poverty that require public sector help. History suggests that as countries become more developed and their people more educated and socialised into expecting upward mobility, or at least good jobs, it is foreign workers who tend to fill low-wage jobs. Not even minoritised citizens or second-generation immigrants are very likely to take these jobs, even though they are more likely to do so than the average native. This means that high unemployment among natives can coexist with a growing demand for low-wage workers. This is the wide-open door for a kind of immigration that contributes to poverty because immigrants are not given a running chance.

The combination of these trends and the built-in creation of low-wage, dead-end jobs in our economies is troublesome. This should be the focus of our regulatory efforts as it would be quite effective in regulating certain components of immigration and at the same time allowing immigrants who do come to get a running start rather than contributing to poverty. Upgrading the dead-end jobs our society needs is one formula to make them more attractive also to native workers and partly to address the problem of unemployment.

EIGHTY-EIGHT MILLION FEWER PEOPLE IN THE EU?

While demographic forecasters are famous for getting it wrong, today we are spared the worst predictions of major declines, if immigration and fertility growth rates stay at current levels over the next few decades. The natural increase in Europe's population is slowing and may start a steep decline within a few decades, researchers say. A major study finds that European population growth reached a turning point in the year 2000 when the number of children dropped to a level that statistically ensured there will be fewer parents in the next generation than there are in the current generation (IIASA 2001).[5]

The momentum is now towards population decline, a trend that could strongly influence population numbers throughout the twenty-first century. If the current fertility rate of around 1.5 births per woman

5 IIASA (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis), *Special Report: Global Population*, IIASA, Vienna, 2001

persists until 2020, the estimate is that there will be 88 million fewer people in 2100, assuming constant mortality and no net migration. The EU is not alone in this trend but along with Japan it may have the most dramatic fall. The USA is expected to decline by 34 million by the end of this century given current fertility, mortality and migration patterns.

While current fertility conditions are now a fact, the longer term fall in the EU's population can be stopped or reduced: raising future fertility rates, lowering mortality rates, raising immigration. Further, for many (let us say some of my family in the Netherlands) a loss of population might not seem so bad for overcrowded Europe. But it would generate new problems, the best known being an insufficient number of working Europeans to support the pension funds of an ageing population. There are again different options for addressing some of these problems. We could shrink our whole socioeconomic apparatus: lower pensions, fewer and lower quality public collective consumption systems, such as trains, hospitals, schools, and so on. Those with enough money could produce an effective demand for privatised services. Technology could raise productivity and hence incomes, making up for the lower numbers supporting our huge number of retired people. It is doubtful that any of these could make up for the demographic fall in the second half of the century.

There are few practical options to counter the facts of a significant share of low-wage dead-end jobs and demographic decline. It is difficult to think that immigration will not be part of the solution. In many ways, immigration does look like the easiest, fastest and perhaps cheapest option. It is also the one that Europe's societies have historically opted for. And it is the one that can enrich our society.

HOW DID WE DO IT IN THE PAST? WE WORKED AT IT

In the past, the reasons for taking in migrants and their origins differed from today's, but the fact remains that all of what today are major European countries took in immigrants for centuries. And considerable numbers never left. How did we handle this as societies in the recent and in the remote past? Can we learn something from our own history about integration?

It is a fact that the immigrant groups of the past are today reasonably incorporated, though there are important differences. These older immigrant groups, dating back three or four generations into past centuries, have given us many of today's citizens. They are not the issue in today's debates. But they were the issue in their time.

Anti-immigrant sentiment and attacks happened in each of the major immigration phases in all these countries. No labour-receiving country comes out clean – not even France, the most open to immigration and to refugees and exiles, or Switzerland with its long admirable history of international neutrality. But there were always, as is also the case today, individuals, groups, organisations and politicians who maintained that we needed to incorporate immigrants. There is considerable evidence on both sides of the debate. History suggests that those fighting for incorporation in the long run won, even though it was a partial and imperfect victory. Just to focus on the recent past, a third of the French can trace a

CTTE_A_206798.fm Page 644 Thursday, November 30, 2006 12:47 PM

foreign-born ancestor three generations back, as can forty per cent of Viennese.

Out of their struggles for incorporation came some of the institutions we most admire and count on in our Western tradition; those that enable the members of our communities, no matter how poor or ill-educated, to have access to full civil and social rights, if not political rights. It was not easy, and when one reads the records from that time there seemed to be insoluble problems. It was not a perfect resolution, nor was it perfectly executed. But it did leave us with sturdy institutions that can function as tools to ensure reasonable outcomes when it comes to the politics of membership.

There is strong evidence of a cyclical character to anti-immigration politics and a clouding of the issues that comes with it. For centuries Europe's major economies have gone through rapid cycles of great demand and then severe expulsion, only to fall back into high demand a few decades later. If we consider the growing demand for low-wage workers and sharp population decline in today's EU, it is easy to see that we might actually switch to a phase of sharp demand for more immigration in a decade if not sooner. In the recent past, a country like France had a desperate need for immigrants in the First World War (using Algerian immigrants in its armies) and in the postwar reconstruction, only to move into aggressive anti-immigrant politics in the 1930s, and then wind up with an acute need for foreign workers in the late 1940s, and so on. In my reading of history and of today's conditions, we are still going through this cyclical pattern.

Part of the difficulty for old Europe is, ironically, the lack of a historical perspective. Europe has a barely recognised history of several centuries of internal labour migrations. This is a history that hovers in the penumbra of official European History dominated by the image of Europe as a continent of emigration, never of immigration. In the 1700s, when Amsterdam built its polders and cleared its bogs, it brought in northern German workers; when the French built up their vineyards they brought in Spaniards; when Milan and Turin developed they brought in workers from the Alps. In the 1800s, when Haussmann redid Paris, he brought in Germans and Belgians; when London built its infrastructure for water and sewage, it brought in the Irish; when Sweden decided to become a monarchy and needed handsome palaces, it brought in Italian stoneworkers; when Switzerland built the Gotthard Tunnel, it brought in Italians; and when Germany built its railroads and steel mills it brought in Italians and Poles.

At any given time there were multiple significant intra-European migration flows. All the workers involved were seen as outsiders, as undesirables, as threats to the community, as people that could never become part of the community. But they did become part of the community – not all of them but significant numbers. However, it took more than two generations, and typically three. Even when they kept their distinctiveness, they were members of the community. They became part of the complex, highly heterogeneous 'We' of any developed society. But at the time of their first arrival they were treated as outsiders, racialised as different in looks, smells, habits, even though they were so often of the same phenotype and from the same broad religious and cultural group. They were all Europeans, but the differences were experienced as overwhelming.

CTTE_A_206798.fm Page 645 Thursday, November 30, 2006 12:47 PM

Today we deal with different religions and phenotypes and cultures, and we think that is the reason for the difficulty of incorporation. Our very European history suggests we had feelings of similar intensity about those who from today's perspective appear to be 'one of us': the Germans, the Belgians, the Italians, just about any of the current EU membership. Given the acts of violence and the hatreds we felt against them, I cannot help but wonder whether those who we experience today as so different and difficult to assimilate will not undergo the same transformation over the coming generations.